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318 PEOPLE v. HOYT [20 C. (2d) 
advise the jury that after its assessment of the penalty its 
duty was ended. The court's remarks were entirely prop<>r. 
(People v. Ramos, 3 Cal. (2d) 269, 273 [44 P. (2d) 301]; 
People v. Bruno, 49 Cal. App. 372, 376-379 [193 Pac. 511].) 
[11] Nor do wc find anything of a prejudicial character 
in the conduct of the prosecuting attorney. Many of the mat-
ters complained of are trivial and such as frequently occur 
in the trial of conteSted cases. Some of the remarks in the 
closing argument castigated the appellants, singly or as a 
group, but in so doing counsel cannot be said to have tran-
scended the. rules of propriety. Reasonable inferences may 
be drawn from the evidence by counsel in the eourse of argu-
ment. (People v. Burdg, 95 Cal. App. 259, 269 [272 Pac. 
816].) [12] Moreover, the question whether counsel preju-
dicially overstepped the bounds of propriety is a matter 
lar~ely within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. 
Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 621-622 [45 Pac. 860] ; People v. Hanks, 
35 Cal. App. (2d) 290,302-303 [95 P. (2d) 478].) 
[13] The final contention concerns the impanelment of 
the jury. It is urged that the trial court improperly allowed 
a departure from the order prescribed by section 1088 of the 
Penal Code for the exercise of peremptory challenges. The ~ 
assignment is unavailing in the absence of a showing of preju-
dice to appellants' substantial rights. (People v. Hickman, 
204 Cal. 470, 481 [268 Pac. 909, 270 Pac. 1117]; People v. 
Troutman, 187 Cal. 313, 320 [201 Pac. 928].) [14] Certain 
of the appellants also object to the scope of interrogation pur-
sued' by prosecuting counsel in the course of the voir dire 
examination wherein on occasions a prospective juror was 
asked whether in the event he was "satisfied beyond all rea-
sonable doubt· and to a moral certainty that five defendants 
would be guilty of murder in the first degree," he had "ahy 
conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death pen-
alty as to the defendant that didn't actually participate in 
the killing of Ferrari f" Under the circumstances existing 
at· the time, the query was permissible and an answer in the 
affirmative furnished sufficient basis for the court's allowance 
of.a challenge for cause. (Penal Code, § 1074, subd. 8.) 
What has been· said sufficiently disposes of all contentions 
requiring discussion. From a consideration of the. whole rec-
ord, it is our opinion that as to the appellants Hoyt, Arnold 
and Frazier, no prejudicial error was committed in the rul-
ings of the court and that all questions of fact involved were 
~ubmitted .w the jury under proper instructions.. 
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For the reasons herein stated, the judgments and the order 
denying motions for a new trial are affirmed as to appellants 
Hoyt, Arnold and Frazier. As to the appellant Tosi, the 
judgment and order denying new trial are reversed. 
Appellant Hoyt's petition for a rehearing was denied May 
28,1942. 
[L. A. No. 16964. In Bank. May 1, 1942.J 
RANCHO SANTA ANITA, INC., Appellant, V •. CITY OF 
ARCADIA (a Municipal Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Statutes-Enactment-By Reference-E:ffect of Subsequent 
Changes in Law Referred to.-Where one statute incorporates 
another by specific reference to the title, the latter is incor-
porated as it then exists, not as it is subsequently modified. 
This rule applies to an ordinance providing that "all provi-
sions of title IX of the Political Code ... in regard to reve-
nue and taxation which are not inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this ordinance shall ... govern all matters of revenue 
and taxation." 
[2], Taxation-Power-Legislative Character.-The taxing power 
of a city and all limitations thereon are derived from the Con-
stitution and statutes. 
[3a,3b] Id.-Levy-Rate.-Const., art XI, § 12, does not preclude 
a city from acquiring by taxation more funds than are neces-
sary for the expenditures of any given year. In the absence 
of a constitutional or statutory requirement that the tax rate 
conform to estimated budgetary e'xpenditures, a city council 
is free to levy a tax that will yield a surplus. 
[4] Id.-Power-Legislative Character-Judicial Review.-In the 
absence of constitutional or statutory limitations, the amount 
of revenue necessary for the needs of a municipality is within 
[2] See 24 Cal. Jur. 43. 
[4] See 24 Cal. Jur. 43-46. 
t 
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the sole discretion of the legislative authorities, and thi" dis-
cretion is not subject to judicial interference. 
[5] Municipal Corporations-Bonds-Taxes.-In the Municipal 
Bond Act of 1901, § 7 (Stats. 1901, p. 27; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1937, Act 517E), the provision that the city must levy a tax 
sufficient to meet the annual interest and principal payments 
on bonds is a minimum, not a maximum, requirement. Where 
the taxes that go into the various bond interest and sinking 
funds do not exceed the entire unpaid balance of principal 
and interest due from each fund, they are not excessive in 
amount, even if, taking account of cash on hand and delin-
quent tax payments, they yield more than the amount neces-
sary to meet the annual interest and principal payments. 
[6] ld. - Fiscal Matters -" Transfer of Funds. - The Municival 
Bond Act of 1901, § 7, providing in part that the taxes levied 
shall be used for no other purpose than the payment of bonds 
and interest, ~s not violated by an appropriation from bond 
funds to a water fund of the alliount advanced from it to the 
bond funds. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Robert W. Kenny, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover a portion of taxes paid. Judgment of 
dismissal, following the sustaining of a demurrer to the com-
plaint without leave to arr.end, affirmed. 
Stater & Dawson and Williamson, Hoge, Sargent & Judson 
for Appellant. 
James C. Bone, City Attorney, and Burke, Hickson, Burke 
& Marshall for Respondent. 
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel, and S. V. O. Prichard, 
Assistant County Counsel, as Amici Curiae, on behalf of 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Arcadia, a city of the sixth class, levies and 
colle'cts its own taxes by virtue of section 871 of the Munici-
pal Corporations Act. (Stats.1883, p. 93; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1937, Act 5233, § 871.) In 1913 the city council adopted an Of-
dinance providing: " All provisions of Title IX of the Political 
Code of the State of California in regard to revenue and taxa-
tion which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordi-
_.-----------------------------
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nance shall apply to and govern all matters of revenue and 
taxation which are not herein specifically provided for, sub-
stituting where necessary the proper city officer for any county 
officer therein referred to." At that time section 3714 of the 
Political Code, included within title IX, provided: "The 
Board of Supervisors of each county must, on the third Mon-
day in September, fix the rate of county taxes, designating 
the number of cents on each one hundred dollars of property 
levied for each fund, and must levy the state and county 
taxes upon the taxable property of the county; provided, that 
it shall not be lawful for any Board of Supcrvisors of any 
county in the state to levy, nor shall any tax greater than 
fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of property be levied 
and collected in anyone year, to pay the bonded indebtedness, 
or judgment arising therefrom, of this state, or of any county 
or municipality of this state.' 'Subsequent amendments, ex-
tending the section to six and one-half pages, require each 
county board of supervisors to adopt a budget and to levy 
taxes in accordance with the budgetary requirements after 
all cash on hand and lllcoming revenues have been applied 
toward meeting the necessary expenditures . 
• ' In 1937 the City Council of Arcadia adopted a budget that 
set forth the estimated cxpenditures for the ensuing fiscal 
year, and the taxes levied by the city for that fiscal year 
went into the general fund, the library fund, and the bond 
funds. Plaintiff, an Arcadian landowner, paid its taxes under 
protest, and when its claim for refund was denied, brought 
this action in the superior court to recover a portion of the 
taxes. The defendant city's demurrer was sustained without 
leave to amend, and plaintiff has appealed from the judgment 
of dismissal. 
Plaintiff contends that the taxes paid by it under the 1937 
levy were illegal because the city council failed to consider 
available cash on hand and other revenue in fixing the tax 
rate. '1'he complaint alleged that in view of these revenues 
the tax rate as fixed by the council yielded almost double the 
amount necessary to meet the estimated expenditures for the 
general and library fund and the bond obligations. Plaintiff 
also contcnds that appropriations and tax levies were made 
in five of the bond interest and sinking funds for purposes 
not authorized by law. 
[1] Title IX of the Political Codc is concerned only with 
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state and county taxation and therefore does not apply to the 
, defendant city except insofar as it is incorporated by refer-
ence into the city ordinantJe of 1913. The provisions restrict-
ing the amount of taxes to budgetary requirements were added 
to the Political Code subsequent to the passage of that ordi-
nance. Plaintiff contends that the ordinance incorporated 
title IX not only as it then existed but as afterwards revised. 
It is not necessary to decide whether the city council had the 
constitutional authority to adopt unknown, future enact-
ments of the state Legislature because the ordinance makes 
clear the council's intention to adopt article IX only ilB it 
then existed. When one statute incorporates the provisions 
of another by a specific reference to the title, the latter is 
incorporated as it then exists and not as it is subsequently 
modified. (Ramish v. Hartwell, 126 Cal. 443 [58 Pac. 920] ; 
Vallejo etc. R. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 177 Cal. 249 [170 
Pac. 426] ; Thoits v. Byxbee, 34 Cal. App. 226 [167 Pac. 166] ; 
Culver v. The People, 161 Ill. 89 [43 N. E. 812]. See San Luis 
Obispo v. Pettit, 87 Cal. 499 [25 Pac. 694] ; In re Yick W 0, 
68 Cal. 294 [9 Pac. 139, 58 Am. St. Rep. 12] ; 2 Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, (2d ed.) 787-789; and cases cited in 
59 C. J. 1060.) The 1913 ordinance refers specifically to 
title IX of the Political Code and makes no reference to 
subsequent modifications. The defendant city was therefore 
not required to comply with those provisions of title IX 
adopted after 1913. 
[2] Plaintiff maintains, however, that even if defendant 
is not bound by the amended provisions of section 3714, the 
failure of the city council to tll;ke into account cash on hand 
and incoming revenues in fixing the taxes rendered the lat-
ter illegal. The taxing power of the city and all limitations 
thereon are derived from the Constitution and statutes. Ar-
ticle XI, section 12 of the Constitution provides: "Except as 
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the legislature shall 
have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns or 
other public or municipal corporations, or upon the in-
habitants or property thereof, for county, city, town, or other 
municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest in the 
corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect 
taxes for such purposes." Pursuant to this section the Legis-
lature enacted the Municipal Corporation Law, section 862.11 
of which authorizes a city of the sixth class "To levy and 
collect annually a property tax, which shall not, without the 
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assent of two~thirds of the qualified electors of such city vot-
. ing at an election to be held for that purpose,: exceed one dollar 
on each hllndred dollars .... " (Stats. 1935, p.2070; Deering's 
Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5233, § 862.11.) Section 871 of the same 
statute provides that" The city council shall have the power, 
and it shall be its duty, to provide by ordinance a system for 
the assessment, levy and collection of all city taxes not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this chapter. Nothing herein shall 
prevent the city council from exercising the power granted by 
the general laws of the State relative to the assessment and col-
lection of taxes by county officers." (Stats. 1883, p. 93; Deer-
ing's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5233, § 871.) Other sections provide 
for the collection of license fees, street poll taxes,fines, pen-
alties, and forfeitures; impose debt limitations; and require the 
city clerk to prepare an annual summary of receipts and dis-
bursements for the past fiscal year. (Stats. 1883, p. 93; Deer-
ing's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5333, §§ 862.12, 862.9, 873, 878.) At 
the time of the levy in question, there was no constitutional or 
statutory requirement that the defendant city prepare a budget 
or estimate its expenditures for an ensuing fiscal year, that in-
coming revenues and cash on hand be deducted from anticipated 
expenditures, or that the tax be levied only for an amount 
.. ":' sufficient to produce the difference between estimated ex-
penditures and cash on hand plus anticipated income. 
[Sa] Article XI, 'section 12 of the Constitution quoted 
above provides that the taxing power conferred upon cities 
by the Legislature may be exercised, only for municipal' pur-
poses, but this limitation does not require a city to spend all 
its tax funds during the year for which they are collected. 
So long as the funds are ultimately utilized for a municipal 
purpose, the city is free to acquire by taxation more funds 
than are necessary for the expenditures of any given year 
and thereby to accumulate a surplus available for municipal 
expenditures or for purposes of tax reduction in later years. 
(Compare Rev. & Tax. Code, § 4806.) 
[4] In the absence of constitutional or statutory limita-
tions the amount of revenue necessary for the needs of a 
municipality is within the sole discretion of the legislative 
authorities and this discretion is not subject to judicial inter-
ference. (See cases cited in 24 Cal. Jur. 43-46, §§ 26, 27. See 
Stull v. De Mattos, 23 Wash. 71 [62 Pac. 451, 51 L. R. A. 
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tion, except as permitted by statute, is limited. The courts 
cannot pass upon the question of the policy of a tax law or 
the expediency of the exercise of the taxing body or the wis-
dom or fairness of the method of distributing the burden of 
taxation where no provision of the Constitution is violated." 
(4 Cooley, Taxation, (4th ed.) p. 3220.) 
[3b] The fact that the city council did adopt a budget 
setting forth estimated expenditures for the ensuing year did 
not oblige the council to levy taxes at a rate that would yield 
no more than was necessary to meet such expenditures. Since 
there was no constitutional or statutory requirement that the 
tax rate conform to estimated budgetary expenditures, the 
council was free to levy a tax that would yield a surplus. The 
economic and social considerations that underlie such a course 
of action are properly subject to legislative discretion rather 
than to judicial review. 
In the case of Otis v. Los Angeles CO~tnty, 9 Cal. (2d) 366 
[70 P. (2d) 633J, cited by plaintiff, a tax levy was held in-
valid because the county had violated Political Code section 
3714. Since the defendant city is not governed by that section, 
the case does not apply to the present situation. Madary v. 
City of Fresno, 20 Cal. App. 91 [128 Pac. 340], and Redman 
v. Warden, 92 Cal. App. 636 [268 Pac. 686], are also distin-
guishable from the instant case. In the Madary case a tax- . 
payer was permitted to recover a portion of his taxes when 
the State Board of Equalization increased assessed property 
valuations after the city had fixed its tax rate on the basis 
of the old valuations. The increased valuations resulted in 
the collection of a much higher tax than the city had intended 
to levy. In the Redman case a tax levy was held invalid 
because part of the property in the tax district was omitted 
from the levy, thereby increasing the tax burden upon the 
remainder of the property in the district. In the present case 
the city intended to levy the taxes in question, and there was 
no discrimination against any taxpayer. In the case of South-
ern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angdes County, 15 Cal. (2d) 1 
[97 P. (2d) 963J, this court upheld the validity of section 
3804.1 of the Political Code which denies the right to recover 
taxes levied at an excessive rate in violation of Political Code 
section 3714, when the taxes arc used in a succeeding year to 
reduce the tax levy or applied for a public purpose, thereby 
indicating that there are no constitutional limitations upon 
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the right of a city to levy taxes in excess of current fiscal 
requirements. 
The taxes that went into bond interest and sinking funds 
were levied under the authority of the Municipal Bond Act of 
1901 (Stats. 1901, p. 27; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 
5178), section 7 of which provides: "The legislative branch 
of said city, town or municipaltiy shall at the time of fixing 
the general tax levy, and in the manner for such general tax 
levy provided, levy and collect annually each year until said 
bonds are paid, Or until there shall be a sum in the treasury 
of said city, town or municipality set apart for that purpose 
to meet all sums coming due for principal and interest on 
such bonds, a tax sufficient to pay the annual interest bn 
such bonds, and also such part of the principal thereof as 
shall become due before the time for fixing the next general 
tax levy. Provided, however, that if the maturity of the in_ 
debtedness created by the issue of bonds be made to begin 
more' than one year after the date of the issuance ,of such 
bonds, such tax shall be levied and collected at the time and 
in the manner aforesaid annually each year, sufficient to pay 
the interest on such indebtedness a.s it falls due, and also 
~'; to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal 
thereof on or before maturity. The taxes herein required to 
be levied and collected shall be in addition to all other taxes 
levied for municipal purposes, and shall be collected at the 
time and in the same manner as other municipal taxes are 
collected, and be used for no other purpose than the payment 
of said bonds and accruing interest." 
[5] Plaintiff contends that under this section taxes levied 
by the defendant city for the paymenfof interest and prin-
cipal on bonds may not yield more than is necessary to meet 
the interest and principal payments accruing during the year 
for which the levy is made. The provision in the section, how-
ever, that the city must levy a tax sufficient to meet the 
annual interest and principal payments on bonds is a mini-
mum, not a maximum; requirement. The city must levy at 
least enough taxes in any given year to meet the annual in" 
terest and principal require~ents, but it may, in itsdiscre-
tion, levy sufficient tuxes to meet in whole or in part thebal-
ance of the bond issue, including both principal and interest. 
Its latitude in this regard is evident from the fact that no 
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treasury set apart to meet all sums coming due for principal 
and interest on the bonds, and there is no restriction upon 
the right of the council to create this fund. Likewise, there 
is no restriction upon the amount that may be placed in the 
sinking fund to meet future principal payments on bonds 
that begin to mature more than one year after' the date of 
issuance. Since the taxes that went into the various bond 
interest and sinking funds did not exceed the entire unpaid 
balance of principal and interest due from each fund, they 
were not excessive in amount even if, taking account of cash 
on hand and delinquent tax payments, they yielded more 
than was necessary to meet the annual interest and principal payments. 
[6] Included within the budget adopted by the city coun-
cil was an appropriation from five of the bond funds of an 
amount owed to the water fund. Plaintiff contends that this 
appropriation and the taxes levied to meet it are in violation 
of the. last part of the section quoted above providing that 
"the taxes herein required to be levied and collected shall be 
... used for no other purpose than the payment of said bonds 
and accruing interest." The appropriation, however, simply 
provided for the repayment to the water fund of sums ad-
vanced from it to the bond funds. There is no allegation in 
the complaint that the sums advanced from the water fund 
were used for any purpose other than the payment of bond 
principal and interest. In effect the sums appropriated were 
used to pay bond principal and interest by repaying the 
advances made from the water fund for this purpose. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., con-curred. 
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting._I agree with the conclusion 
that the ordinance of the city of Arcadia did not require the 
city council to follow the requirements of section 3714 of the 
Political Code in levying its assessment for the fiscal year 
1937-38 but, in my opinion, the allegations of the plaintiff's 
complaint clearly show that the council levied taxes at a rate 
designed to produce more revenue than was required for 
governmental purposes during the ensuing fiscal year and that 
such levy is void as to the excess. 
In considering the validity of a tax levy, the courts will 
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consider two important elements: (1) whether the power ex-
ists to make the levy; and, (2) whether:that power has been 
exercised within statutory limitations. "The authority of 
the judiciary is confined to an inquiry into the jurisdictional 
question, and if it appears that the poiitical· or legislative 
body has kept within the limits onts authority, the judiciary 
must pause there and admit its incompetency to inquire into 
wrongs which, within those limits may have been committed." 
(San Christina etc. Co. v. San Francisco, 167 Cal. 762 [141 
Pac. 384, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 676] ; 4 Cooley's Taxation, 4th ed., 
p. 3218.) Unlike the sovereign state, counties and other mu-
nicipal subdivisions possess no inherent power of taxation. 
The Constitution itself does not grant them the taxing power,' 
but the Legislature is authorized to ". . .by general laws, 
vest' in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess 
and collect taxes ... !, for county, city, town, or other mu-
nicipal purposes. (Const. art. XI, § 12.) Pursuant to this 
constitutional authority, the Legislature has authorized the 
council of a city of the sixth class "To levy and collect an-
nually a property tax, which shall not, without the assent of 
two-thirds of the qualified electors of such city voting at an 
.... election to be held for that purpose exceed one dollar on each 
'. one hundred dollars .... " (Stats. 1935, p. 2070; Deering's 
Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 5233, § 862.11.) 
By the same statute, "The city council shall have the power, 
and it shall be its duty, to provide by ordinance a system for 
the assessment, levy and collection of all city taxes not in-
consistent with the provisions of this chapter. Nothing herein 
shall prevent the city council from exercising the power 
granted by general laws of the state relative to the assessment 
and collection of taxes by county officers." (§ 871.) 
The specifically mentioned general limitations upon mu-
nicipal power to tax are (1) that the municipal levy 'be 
annual; (2) that in the absence of special election, the maxi-
mum levy shall not exceed one dollar for each one hundred 
dollars assessed value; and (3) that a system shall be estab-
lished by ordinance for the assessment, levy and collection 
of such taxes. 
But in addition to these express provisions is the limitation 
inherent in the nature of the taxing power itself, that is, 
public necessity. "Taxes are defined to be burdens or charges 
imposed by the legislative power upon persons or property, 
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to raise money for pUhlic purposes. The power to tax rests 
upon necessity, and is inherent in every sovereignty." 
(Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, vol. 2, 8th ed., p. 986.) 
And as an eminent authority on municipal corporation law 
has stated: " ... the suhstantial foundation of the power is 
political, civil, or governmental necessity .... " (Dillon, Mu-
nicipal Corporations, vol. 4, 5th ed., pp. 2313, 2314.) 
This inherent limitation upon the taxing power of munici-
pal corporations has been recognized by the courts of this 
state and stated in one case as follows: "The power of gov-
ernment to exact from the citizen a part of his property in 
way of taxation is indeed vast, but it is not unlimited. It may 
be exereised only for the public good and for a publie pur-
pose. 
"Cooley's definition of taxes as 'enforced contribution 
levied for public needs' states eoneisely both the nature and 
limitation of taxes. Taxes are the property of the eitizens 
demanded and taken by the government to enable it to dis-
charge its funetions. In his work on Tax Titles, Blackwell 
defines taxes as (burdens imposed by the legislative power 
upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes.' 
"The needs of the government constitute then both the 
occasion and limitation of the taxing power. To take from the 
citizen a dollar beyond the needs of government is not taxa-
tion; it is extortion." (Madary v. City of Fresno, 20 Cal. 
App. 91, 97[128 Pac. 340, 343].) 
In a more recent case, the county of Los Angeles contended 
that a levy which produced considerably more money than its. 
budget requirements was not pro tanto invalid in the absence 
of arbitrary or capricious action. Following the Madary case 
and Redman v. Warden, 92 Cal. App. 636 [268 Pac. 686], this 
court decided to the contrary and held that where the taxing 
body, either through inadvertence or design, excludes from 
its computations amounts which will be available to the mu-
nicipality during the period then being provided for, an ex-
cessive levy resulting from 811ch action is invalid. (Otis v. 
Los Angeles County, 9 Cal. (2d) 366 [70 P. (2d) 633].) 
Although that determination was reached in an attack upon 
an assessment which was levied in a county operating under 
the provisions of section 3714 of the Political Code, the reason-
ing of the court is applicable to the present controversy. All 
of the authorities support the rule that where there has been 
an . official determination of governmental need by the legis-
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lativebody, an assessment levied at a rate which will produce 
a return substantially in excess of that previously determined 
need is, to the extent of that excess, invalid. As stated in 
Madary v. City of Fresno, supra, at p. 98, and approved in 
Otis v. Los Angeles County, "It seems eminently just that 
this money collected by the city in excess of its needs as 
determined by the constituted authorities,should be returned 
to those upon whom the unnecessary burden was imposed, and 
no merely technical objection should stand in the way." 
As the basis of its cause of action, the appellant in the 
present action alleged: "That the needs and requirements 
of the city general fund, being the fund for current operating 
expenses and general government purposes, for the fiscal year 
1937 -1938 was the sum of $141,061.14; that thi· taxing officials 
and taxing body of said eity determined and fixed such needs, 
requirements and appropriations in such amount on or about 
the 7th day of September, 1937; that on said date resolution 
No. 878 of the city of Arcadia, entitled," A resolution of the 
city council of the city of Arcadia adopting budget for the 
fiscal year 1937-1938,' was adopted and by such 'resolution 
therJ.eeds, requirements and appropriations for said fund f{)r 
.. ~ said fiscal year were fixed and determined in the aforesaid 
. amount of $141,061.14.. . ." . This resolution constituted 
the official determination of thc city's governmental need, as 
specified in a budget; so far as its current operating expenses 
and general governmental purposes were concerned, entirely 
independent of any unappropriated money in its treasury, and 
there is no basis for any judicial implication that the, council 
considered the cash on hand as a necessary reserve. Such an 
implication would invade the discretion vested in the city 
council. 
The complaint also includes these additional facts upon 
which the appellant relies: '''That at the beginning of said 
fiscal'year there was cash on hand on deposit in the designated 
Uepositorics, belonging to the' credit of said fund for said 
fiscal yCllr, hi the sum of $92,720.13; that there were no legal 
or yltlidontstanding claims, warrants, liabilities or obligations 
against s:lid cash or fund balance . . . that the said cash or 
fundb~iJance was available for the purpose of meeting the 
said }ippropriations, needs or requirements aforesaid ... that 
at the beginning- of said fiscal year, as well as at the time of 
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were charged with knowledge of such cash or fund balance, 
and knew and were charged with knowledge of the availability 
thereof to meet the said needs, requirements and appropria-
tions aforesaid; that, howe~er, the said cash or fund balance 
was not considered either in the adoption of said budget nor 
in the computation, fixing and levying of said tax, but was 
arbitrarily omitted." 
Other allegations of the complaint are that there was mis-
cellaneous income and revenUE belonging to said fund for the 
fiscal year in question of $56,334.58, against which there were 
no outstanding obligations, warrants or liabilities. And the 
appellant has pleaded that no part of the cash on hand or the 
miscellaneous income and revenue was considered either in 
the adoption of the budget or, in the computation of the tux 
rate. 
The doctrine that taxation is based upon necessity rejects 
the authority of the legislative body to accumulate unnecessary 
surpluses from taxes collected by municipal corporations, and 
requires that they confine their levies to the amounts actually 
needed to be determined annually. (People v. Baltimore &; 
O. R. 00., (1941) 376 Ill. 393 [33 N. E. (2d) 604, 605].) This 
principle was recognized in Stuart Arms 00. v. San Fran-
cisco, 203 Cal. 150 [263 Pac. 218], where the court, in effect, 
held that any excess funds collected during one fiscal year 
should be carried over into the next fiscal year and considered 
in the computation fixing the rate for such year. The con-
troversy decided by that case arose in connection with the 
levy made by the city and county of San Francisco for the 
fiscal year 1925-1926. At that time there were no mandatory 
budget provisions in section 3714 of the Political Code. Since 
two and one-half fiscal years had intervened subsequent to 
the filing of the action, said this court, the question was moot 
by lapse of time. "If there was an excess for the year 
1925-1926 the presumption is that it was carried over into 
the next year and entered into the computation of the fixing 
of the rate for said following year. No presumption of irregu-
larity or failure to perform official duty may be indulged 
against municipal or public officers." 
The Supreme Court of Washington has also held taxing 
authorities to the same rule, saying: "It is to be considered 
also that, apart from the creation of sinking funds to meet 
outstanding funded obligations, there is no need for the ac-
cumulation of a surplus, since the resource of taxation is 
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always available within the limitations fixed by law to meet 
the current needs of the county. In' short, any considerable 
surplus represents money taken from the' taxpayer in 'advance 
of its need." ( Weyerhaeuser Timber 00. v. Roessler,2Wn. 
(2d) 304,311 [97 P. (2d) 1070,1073,126 A.L. R. 882,886].) 
Accepting the determination of the city council as to the 
gross amount required for general and library purpoSes dur-
ing the fiscal year, so far as the complaint shows, there is no 
reason why the unappropriated money and incoming revenues 
should not have been taken into consideration by the city 
council in fixing the tax rate. Reserves are justified by sound 
business practices and recognized by law~ But' for a munici-
pality to tax its citizens for the purposes of government while 
having in its treasury unappropriated Inoney' available to 
meet its needs and revenues presently available is economically 
unsound and governmentally unjust. .. 
Turning to the allegations relating to the levy' for bond 
purposes, it appears that the city has six bond issues out-
standing and maintains a separate fund for the payment of 
interest and principal payments accruing on each of them. 
The complaint sets out in detail the amount of cash in each 
of these funds and the incoming revenue creditable during the 
.. ~ fiscal year 1937-1938. According to the complaint, neither the 
cash nor the incoming revenue was considered by the city 
council in fixing the tax levy and, for the reasons which have 
been stated, the appellant's complaint, in Iny opinion, states a 
good cause of action upon that ground. 
In urging that the city exceeded statutory limitations in 
its levy, the appellant relies upon the Municipal Bond Act 
of 1901 which provides that a municipal legislative body has 
power to levy and collect "a tax sufficient to pay the annual 
interest on such bonds, and also such part of the principal 
thereof as shall become due before the time for fixing the 
next general tux levy." (Stats. 1901, p. 27; Deering's Gen. 
Laws, 1937, Act 5178, § 7.) The statute also provides that the 
taxes levied and collected for the purpose of meeting interest 
and sinking fund requirements on bond issues shall be' used 
"for no other purpose than the payment of said bonds and 
accruing interest. " (§ 7.) 
Unquestionably these limitations upon the authority of the 
city were enacted for the protection of both the property 
owner and the bond holder. Taxes Inay be levied for the pur-
: 
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pose of paying interest and instalments of principal upon the 
bonds, but that money may not ue diverted into other chan-
nels. I believe that the appell:mt's allegation..:; of fact showing 
a violation of this statute state a cause of action. 
For these reasons; as I read the authorities, the jndgment 
should be reversed with directions to overrule the demurrer 
and allow the respondent to answer. 
[L. A. No. 17656. In Bank. May 1, 1942.J 
HAROLD L. DAVIS, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] .Attorneys at Law-Disbarment-Proceedings_Procedure Be-
fore Board-Taking Additional Evidence-Additional Find-
ings.-In fulfillment of its duty to make findings of fact in all 
disciplinary proceedings, the Bo:trd of Governors of The State 
Bar may adop;; or reject the findings of the local Itdministra-
tive committee in whole or in part, and, without a trial 
de novo, may take additional evidence and make other find-
ings. 
[2a, 2b] ld. - Disbarment-Proceedings-Review_Evidence_Ad_ 
missions of Embezzlement.-In a proceeding to review the 
recommendation of disbarment of an attorney for conduct 
involving moral turpitude, even assuming that the client told 
the attorney he could keep rings' deposited with him as se-
curity for fees in defending third persons charged with crime, 
his admission that the pledgor had demanded the return of 
the rinA's and that he had given no notice of s:tle thereof 
showed that he embezzled the property. 
[3] Pledges-Remedies-Demand on and Notice to Pledgor.-A 
pledgee is required to give notice to a pledgor and It reason-
able opportunity to redcem his property before making a sale 
of the pledge. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys at Law, § 172 (11); [2,6, 
7] Attorneys at Law, § 176; [3] Pledges, § 71; [4] Attorneys at, 
Law, § 28; [5] Attorne;y:sat Law, § 35. 
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Attorneys at Law-'Rcl:ttion to Client-Good Faith.-In deal-
ing with property pledgcd to him by a client, the attorney's 
professional duty requires him to act toward the client in the 
utmost good faith and comply with the law respecting bail-
ments; 
ld.-Relation to Client-Presumption of Invalidity of Deal-
ings.-An agreement between an attorney and his client by 
which the attorney receives any advantage is presumed to be 
void, and the burden is upon the attorney to provf,} that th(\ 
client freely entered into the agreement. This burden is ,not 
sustained as to an alleged embezzlement of property' pledged 
as security for fces where it appears· that the· client,: because 
of drug addiction, was not responsible, alid that on, the one 
qccasion when the attorney talked to her about the property 
she had not fully recovered from the effects of the dr;ug. 
ld. - Disbarment - Proceedings - Review-Evidenc~Flling 
False Pleading.-A charge that an attorney filed a false veii~ 
fied cross-complaint in It client's action against him to recover 
rings deposited as seeurity for fees, was supported by his 
testimony admitting the fnlsity of the allegations and a~­
tempting to excuse his action, and by that of a bail bond 
broker by whom he attempted to justify his action in dis-
posing of the rings. 
ld. - Disbarment - Proceedings - Review-Evidence-False 
Testimony.-A charge of perjury against an attorney in a 
deposition in a client's action to recover rings deposited with 
hinl was supported where the evidence, including the testi .. 
mony of the attorney in the disbarment proceeding, conclu-
sively showed that the attorney did not, as stated in the 
deposition, dcliver them to the bail bond company as col~ 
lateral security, but that he pawned them and converted the 
money to his own use when the court forfeited the bail bond; 
PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of disbar-
ment. Petitioner disbarred. 
Morris Lavine for Petitioner. 
Claude Minard, Guy Hichards Crump, -;Louis W. Myers, 
B. E. Ahlport and Paul Vallee for Respondent. 
THE COUR'r.-This proceeding was brought to review the 
recommendations of the Board of Governors of The State Bar 
that the petitioner be disbarred from the practice of law. 
[4J ::3ce 3 Cal. JUl'. (j16; 5 Am. Jur. 288. 
